In January 1977, in one of his famous retrospectives on his own work, Michel Foucault suggested that his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, L'ordre du discours, had marked a "moment of transition" in his thought. Because until then he had "accepted the traditional conception of power […] as an essentially juridical mechanism" with negative effects such as "exclusion, rejection, barriers, denials, concealment," he had "provided an inadequate response" to a legitimate question, namely how to "articulate the facts of discourse with the mechanisms of power."1 While this juridical theory of power had not caused too many problems for his study of madness—because madness was a "privileged case" to which power had primarily responded negatively in the form of exclusion—, Foucault's "concrete experience […] starting in the years 1971–1972, with regard to prisons" showed that the juridical model of power was inadequate:
The case of penality convinced me that it wasn't so much in terms of right (droit) but in terms of technology, in terms of tactics and strategy, and it is this substitution of a technical and strategic grid for a juridical and negative grid that I tried to put in place in Discipline and Punish and then use in The History of Sexuality.2
Some months before, in June 1976, Foucault had commented on the difficulty he had had in formulating the question of the relationship between discourse and power. This "incapacity," he suggested, was "undoubtedly linked to the political situation in which we found ourselves." Power was either understood in juridical terms, on the right, or in terms of State apparatuses, on the left. Studying how power was "exercised concretely and in detail, with its specificity, its techniques, and its tactics" only became possible after 1968, "based on daily grassroots struggles with those who had struggled in the finest meshes of the network of power."3 It was, in short, the political events of 1968 and Foucault's involvement with prison activism that required new ways of thinking about power.
Foucault's description of his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France as a transitional moment, situated against the background of a significant politicization of his life and thought, invites us to consider all of his lectures as a window into the work of widening and specifying his understanding and practice of philosophical critique. From a methodological perspective, the lecture courses reflect and perform what Colin Koopman has described as Foucault's "methodological expansion" from archaeology to morphology, dynastic, and genealogy.4 Conceptually, the lectures illuminate Foucault's elaboration of concepts that arise from his genealogies at the same time as they are transformed and, sometimes, abandoned in light of new genealogical insights. As a glimpse into Foucault's laboratory, the lecture courses thus offer inspiration and guidance for those seeking to adapt his practice of critique for their own present. But they also pose challenges for interpreters of Foucault's work and allow for different and even conflicting readings.
This richness and ambivalence are beautifully captured in the contributions collected in the German volume "Fragmente eines Willens zum Wissen" (Heidelberg: Metzler, 2020) on Foucault's lecture series at the Collège de France from 1970 to 1984. Expertly edited and introduced by Frieder Vogelmann, the volume accomplishes the difficult task of providing new insights into the development of Foucault's oeuvre, while also revisiting gaps and silences of his work in an effort to make it fertile for our own present. Tracing Foucault's methodological expansions and conceptual innovations, the authors also press against the limits of his thought to show how we, as readers and users of his work, can continue this movement to go with Foucault beyond Foucault.
Foregrounding questions of method, the first two chapters by Kerstin Andermann and Vojta Drápal trace Foucault's efforts to elaborate a methodological approach suitable for bringing together two vectors of analysis—the facts of discourse and the mechanisms of power—in a single framework. Andermann shows the first step in this development by reading the 1970/71 Lectures on the Will to Know as a morphology of the will to know. As the study of the formation and modification of living beings, a morphological approach allows Foucault to separate knowledge from truth and instead ground it in an autonomous and anonymous will to know that operates in the discursive production of fields of objects. Where the Lectures on the Will to Know develop this morphology in conversation with the history of philosophy, which Foucault reads as an effort to conceal the will to know, the 1971/72 lectures Penal Theories and Institutions respond to the political situation of the time and take political struggles as an impetus and model for Foucault's methodological expansion. As Drápal shows, the police repression of the late 1960s and early 1970s is, in this sense, the Entstehungsherd of Foucault's reworking of morphology into a dynastic of forces. Understood as a reconstruction of the dynamics and constellations of forces in a concrete conflict, Foucault's dynastic is, says Drápal, a propaedeutic to genealogy by juxtaposing and analogizing a specific historical situation with the present. The historical event under examination in the lecture course is the Nu-Pieds revolt of 1639, and the dynastic of forces "enables a play of possible recognition by directing the gaze to specific analogies concerning practices and tactics of revolt" (39). This diachronic juxtaposition of events, however, also raises questions about their temporal connection—a question whose answer requires a method that works not analogically but genealogically. Instead of creating a constellation of past and present through the citation of a past event and blasting it out of the continuum of history,5 genealogy examines the contingent historical events that made the present possible. It is in its genealogical approach to justice administered in the form of the court that Drápal sees the continued relevance of Penal Theories and Institutions for a contemporary critique of rights.6 But as my Benjaminian characterization of Foucault's dynastic approach is meant to suggest, the lecture course also offers spurs for new work in the philosophy of history and exciting points of connection for exploring affinities between Foucault and the early Frankfurt School.7
Shifting focus from the development of Foucault's methodological framework to the limitations of his genealogical studies, the subsequent chapters by Vanessa Eileen Thompson, Katrin Meyer, Daniel Loick, and Gundula Ludwig examine how the shortcomings of his work can be revisited in productive and transformative ways. These chapters contribute to a rich and growing literature on different ways of extending Foucault's philosophical practice to problematics Foucault himself did not consider8 and to efforts to use Foucauldian methods for decolonial and intersectional analysis.9
Recasting The Punitive Society (1972/73) from a postcolonial perspective, Thompson supplements Foucault's account of the emergence of disciplinary power in the eighteenth century with a colonial and intersectional analysis of the differential uses, effects, and temporalities of power with regard to racialized populations. Of particular interest is Foucault's analysis of the prison-form and the wage-form as "twin historical forms" that both operate through the sequestration of time—the wage being payment for the time of labor, and time served in prison being payment for a crime.10 Thompson shows that the sequestration of time functions differently for racialized populations, namely not through the "temporal sequestration of social life" which transforms time into wages for work, but through the "temporal production of 'social death'" that depletes time, reduces marginalized populations to waste, and relegates them to premature death (63). Racializing power thus operates through and simultaneously enables what the political theorist Elizabeth Cohen calls "time theft,"11 whose result is a political economy of time that differentially appropriates time through racialized practices of policing and incarceration, protracted asylum or naturalization procedures, detention in refugee and migrant camps, or mandatory waiting periods for abortion.
In a similar vein, Meyer is interested in the usefulness of the 1973/74 lecture course Psychiatric Power for "intersectional genealogies" (83) of contemporary power relations. For Meyer, the strength of the lectures lies in Foucault's claim that various disciplinary dispositifs are isotopic and can, therefore, be connected to one another. She argues that in the course, Foucault examines several such dispositifs, from the mad king to the colonization of youth, colonized peoples, and delinquents, to the family, and finally the formation of the Psy-function. For Meyer, Psychiatric Power not only constitutes a key moment in the development of Foucault's microphysics of power that supplements his earlier historical study of the formation of knowledges by which the mad were excluded from society with a history of power relations in which those knowledges were embedded; it also is an experiment in conceptual innovation that elaborates concepts of disciplinary power, the subject-function, and the dispositif as points that "bring together heterogeneous elements like discourses, modes of treatment, administrative measures and laws, regulatory arrangements, architectural plans, and so forth" and that require a "style of analysis according to a principle of 'dispersion,' one that multiplies knowledges and practices in order to bring out their components, reconstruct their associated spaces, and establish connections."12 Despite Foucault's insufficient attention to questions of gender, race, and colonialism as driving forces of psychiatric and normalizing power, it is this methodological and conceptual work, Meyer argues, that makes the lectures a fertile resource for contemporary genealogical analysis.
In his chapter on the 1974/75 course, Abnormal, Loick directs our attention to the importance of the family as a focal point of disciplinarization and a relay between individualizing and massifying forms of biopower. Loick rightly insists on the pivotal role of the lecture course in Foucault's oeuvre. As an analysis of the formation of the bourgeois family through the institutionalization of surveillance and a genealogy of modern intimate practices, the lectures anticipate Foucault's critique, in La volonté de savoir, of the repressive hypothesis, insofar as the surveillance of children's sexuality leads to the very sexualization it is intended to prevent. Moreover, the 1974/75 lectures provide a snapshot of the emergence of biopolitics avant la lettre by exposing the family as an access point for and a relay between an anatomo-politics of the body and a biopolitics of the population. Those who resist or escape this access are the abnormal, and the lectures trace their historical predecessors in the monster, the recalcitrant individual, and the masturbating child. What Foucault neglects, Loick argues, is the constitutive role of racism—and particularly anti-Black racism—in the constitution of abnormality. Taking the famous case of the Central Park Five as his example, Loick suggests that the construction of the boys as abnormal through an ascription of monstrosity, incorrigibility, and deviant sexuality worked through and because of their Blackness.
I wonder how we might reconsider Loick's assessment, and his claim that "white youth would not have been, and were not, in a position of being accused in the first place" (95), in light of Foucault's discussion of a "racism against the abnormal"13 of which anti-Black racism is, of course, one crucial manifestation. As Ladelle McWhorter has shown, in the United States, this racism against the abnormal is a biological racism "preoccupied not with attacking members of another race but with protecting the boundaries of the race, the only race that matters, the human race embodied in its 'highest' representatives"—that is, the white Nordic race.14 Therefore, as McWhorter demonstrates, the practices Loick describes as a "destruction of Black life (from forced sterilization to economic debt to mass incarceration)" (98) also targeted other populations that were seen as genetically inferior and behaviorally perverse: "imbeciles, criminals, prostitutes, consumptives, Africans, Asians, Mexicans, Jews, Irishmen, masturbators, deaf-mutes, epileptics, psychopaths, and shiftless Appalachian paupers" who were "all children out of control, throwbacks, savages, and degenerates" who "posed a serious threat to the continued purity of highly evolved Nordic germ plasm."15 Consider, also, Santiago Castro-Gómez's genealogical investigation of how ideas about the superiority of white Europeans played out in the Americas, where they gave rise to a discourse of the purity of blood that produced a complex classificatory system based on racial and social membership and engendered distinct modes of subjectivity, norms of behavior, and bodies of knowledge specific to the colonies.16 While the colonial racism traced by Castro-Gómez is different from the scientific racism charted by McWhorter, both are historically specific forms of a biopolitical technology for administering death to some in order to make others live. It is this genealogical attention to concrete instantiations of a broader mechanism of social control that brings into view both similarities and differences between various forms of racism. This approach can productively inform the sort of intersectional genealogies of contemporary power relations that Loick, Meyer, and Thompson rightly demand.
As Gundula Ludwig's chapter shows, Foucault's 1975/76 lecture course "Society Must Be Defended" constitutes a key moment in such a genealogy of racism. It is in these lectures that Foucault introduces war as a strategic model for analyzing power. He traces this "war dispositif" (105) to the historical discourse of race war, which emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in political struggles in England and France.17 Initially a challenge to sovereign power, the discourse of race war regarded the state as a product of invasion, conquest, and war that was preserved in the mechanisms of power. Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this discourse of race war was transformed into biological state racism that culminated in the fascist regimes of Franco's Spain and Nazi Germany as well as in the socialist state racism of the Soviet Union. This genealogy, on Ludwig's argument, reveals that the juridical theory of sovereignty is itself a strategy of power that serves to render war invisible and that theorizations of power are themselves interventions in political struggles.
The "Society Must Be Defended" lectures also raise a larger question about the development and periodization of Foucault's thought. On Ludwig's account, the lecture course concludes his genealogical analyses and opens up a new strategic approach to studying power. But subsequent chapters on Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics, as well as later contributions on practices of the self, challenge this interpretation and instead insist on the continued expansion, rather than conclusion and reorientation, of Foucault's work. In particular, what comes into view over the course of the 1977–1979 lectures, as well as in the 1982–1984 lectures, is Foucault's supplementation of a critical genealogy of power with a genealogy of critique.
This dimension of the governmentality lectures has largely been ignored in the secondary literature, even though—and indeed largely because—the so-called "governmentality lecture," delivered on February 1, 1978, as part of the 1977/78 course Security, Territory, Population, was first published in Italian with the title "La 'governamentalità'" in 1978, translated into English in 1979, and reproduced in French in 1986 as "La gouvernementalité." As Vogelmann notes in the introduction to the volume, the lecture inaugurated a vast and interdisciplinary research program known as governmentality studies, whose primary focus is on the interplay of governmental rationalities, especially neoliberalism, and modes of subjectivation. Because, Vogelmann explains, this body of scholarship has by and large failed to adopt "Foucault's practice of a permanent reworking of his methodological vocabulary" (11) so as to update its analytic value for a present that is no longer that of Foucault,18 it has become rather loosely connected to Foucault's historically specific studies of governmental rationalities such as neoliberalism.
The volume's chapters on Security, Territory, Population (1977–78) and The Birth of Biopolitics (1978–79) are a much-needed correction to this trend and succeed in adding new insights to a debate that is slowly but surely running out of steam. By extending Foucault's genealogical method to a study of counter-conducts beyond the medieval period, Friedrich Balke considers the pastoral structure of revolutionary discourse leading up to the French Revolution and identifies a form of dissidence that was not a challenge to pastoral power but a repudiation of the king's dereliction of his pastoral duties. Balke's chapter also offers a model of how Foucault's genealogical method can usefully be applied to sites of inquiry that escaped his attention in ways that might well suggest the need for a revision and reassessment of his diagnostic work.
Andreas Folkers' reading of the Birth of Biopolitics as a critical genealogy of neoliberalism and a genealogy of neoliberalism as critique compellingly shows that neoliberalism is not only a governmental rationality but also a critique of government that insists on not wanting to be governed like that. The late 1970s lectures thus appear not as the conclusion of Foucault's reflections on (bio)power and governmentality but as a specification of his analytic of power and part of a genealogy of critique that would concern him for the rest of his life.
Maria Muhle insists on this very point in her chapter on the 1979/80 lectures On the Government of the Living, which are typically read as a switch point between Foucault's work on power and his interest in the subject and in practices of the self. For Muhle, such an interpretation is untenable, given Foucault's long-standing account of the subject as suffused by power relations through and through. Yet while his earlier work focused on processes of subjectivation through the exercise of power on the subject (even if in the form of the subject inscribing power relations in itself),19 his recasting of the analytic of power as a study of government now allows him to ask about the interplay of techniques of being governed and of governing oneself and the subject's subsequent possibilities for governing itself, and therefore be governed, differently. Foucault is interested in the government of human beings by truth, and specifically through the need to manifest truth in the form of subjectivity.20 Therefore, as Stuart Elden has argued, On the Government of the Living is not a moment of rupture but instead the "third of Foucault's courses on 'governmentality.'"21 To this, Muhle adds that it is also a genealogy of the modern subject whose birth Foucault traces not to the Greco-Roman ideal of an "autonomous, free, independent, true subject" (172) but to Christian practices of penance, self-examination, avowal, and a renunciation of self that constitute a subject marked by "heteronomy, duties, dependencies, and historical encoding" (173).
What is curiously absent in On the Government of the Living is a focus on sexuality, given that Foucault considers much of the same material in the fourth volume of the History of Sexuality, Confessions of the Flesh. As Daniele Lorenzini has persuasively argued, this is because Foucault is now pursuing two relatively independent research projects: one on the genealogy of the critical attitude and of the government of the self and others through truth; and another one on the history of sexuality that traces a genealogy of the subject of desire.22 While the final three lectures courses at the Collège de France are part of the first project, the 1980/81 lecture course Subjectivity and Truth contributes to the second project by tracing the emergence of the subject of desire in the Stoic transformation of ancient Greek aphrodisia. As Francesca Raimondi shows in her chapter on Subjectivity and Truth, Foucault examines aphrodisia as an economy of sexual pleasures organized by the principle of a socio-sexual isomorphism, whereby sexual relations were understood in continuity with social relations, and a principle of activity. He is especially interested in aphrodisia as a mode of experience—that is, a modality of "the relation of self to self in the relation that we may have with a certain domain of objects related to sex"23—from which the Christian experience of the flesh and the modern experience of sexuality can be distinguished. Whereas aphrodisia consisted in the cultivation of the right use of pleasures, Stoic philosophy led to a valorization, eroticization, and codification of marriage as the only site of appropriate sexual relations and a devaluation and indeed prohibition of other forms of sexuality. This new economy of sexual pleasures that confines pleasure to the marriage relation and makes the spouse the exclusive and affectively charged object of pleasure gives rise to a new experience of desire. The lectures are, therefore, an attempt to show "how desire, far from having been repressed, is something that was gradually extracted and emerged from an economy of pleasures and bodies" and how it became "the principle of subjectivation/objectivation of sexual acts."24
It is in this genealogy of the subject of desire that Raimondi identifies the relevance of the lecture course for contemporary queer and feminist critiques of binary sex and gender. In contrast to a "differentiation of sex and gender in an Anglo-Saxon context around the same time of the lecture course," Raimondi finds in Foucault "a unique perspective on the constitution of sex/gender (Geschlecht) based on a historically variable 'use' of pleasures" (176). Against a queer affirmation of desire, Foucault traces its emergence to the "gloomy sexual ethics"25 of the Stoa that is incorporated, in modified form, into the Christian dispositif of the flesh and the sexual ethics of the bourgeois family. His study of aphrodisia also reveals an economy of bodies and pleasures that is not organized around desire. Subjectivity and Truth thus concretizes Foucault's claim at the end of La volonté de savoir that the "rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures"26 by excavating concrete practices in which a "different economy of bodies and pleasures"27 actually existed and can exist again.
In The Hermeneutics of the Subject (1981/82), Foucault returns to the project of a genealogy of the critical attitude and the question of governing the self in relation to truth. His focus is on the care of the self, of which the injunction to know oneself is only one part. Andreas Gelhard draws attention to Foucault's excavation of a mode of experience that is made possible by ascetic practices of self-formation (Selbstbildung), in particular practices of parrhesia and the test. By zeroing in on techniques of test and exercise, Gelhard argues, Foucault elaborates a theory of experience that is surprisingly close to Hegel, whose Phenomenology he references as a moment in which the care of the self emerges as an object of philosophical reflection. But even though the Phenomenology, like Foucault's lecture course, "develops an elaborate theory of the test character of experience" (202), it is rooted in a skeptical tradition that Foucault largely declines. Gelhard suggests that a skeptical and, therefore, dialectical inflection of Foucault's project might help us gain a new perspective on the reversibility of power relations as a condition of possibility for freedom. But as the previous chapters suggest, it is precisely Foucault's displacement of the notion of power via a focus on government that enables him to answer this challenge. By expanding his methodological and conceptual apparatus from power to government and from knowledge to truth, Foucault is able to consider genealogically, rather than dialectically, the subject's capacity to transform its mode of being governed by itself and others through practices of self-formation.
Recalling Drápal's earlier discussion of Foucault's dynastic of forces as a constellation of past and present that activates the recognitive potential of analogy, Aaron Sabellek and Ulrich Johannes Schneider read the 1982/83 lecture course The Government of Self and Others as a scenographic approach to the history of philosophy as a form of parrhesiastic speech. On this view, the lectures stage scenes of parrhesia—from Plato's philosophical parrhesia during his voyages to Sicily to political, juridical, and moral parrhesia in Euripides' Ion—to achieve a historicization and defamiliarization of parrhesia that produces effects in the present. In addition to the lectures' contribution to the project of a genealogy of the critical attitude by way of a study of historically concrete ways in which this attitude was expressed in parrhesiastic speech, this methodological observation foregrounds the profound continuity of Foucault's work. So we might want to revise Sabellek and Schneider's conclusion that the "late Foucault" is "no longer an analyst of disciplinary powers and modes of governing but an interpreter and commentator of ancient authors" (219) and instead suggest that Foucault reads ancient authors in an effort to identify concrete practices of governing oneself differently, and thus of critique.
The embodiment of such practices of critique in a form of life is the focus of Katharina Hoppe's closing chapter on the Cynics' parrhesiastic bios, which is the topic of the 1983/84 lecture course The Courage of Truth. Hoppe zeroes in on the specifically embodied character of Cynic parrhesia, which constitutes a form of life that "breaks with a concept of emancipation as liberation from necessity and instead understands freedom in terms of necessity" (236). Cynic parrhesia is, thus, a powerful alternative to a "politics of purity" that aims to "free itself from the lowly necessities of life" (234), but it is not a form of life that is free from power relations. Indeed, as Hoppe insists, while Foucault "brings into view a new mode of subjectivation," this "other life of whatever form also deploys new forms of government. The other life remains immanent to the world and does not transcend power relations; it displaces them and reworks them—but it does not promise ultimate 'liberation'" (235). On this view, possibilities for freedom emerge not in the liberation from the body and its necessities but in capacities and spurs for transformation that emerge precisely from a shared condition of precarity, vulnerability, and dependence.
In On the Government of the Living, Foucault remarked that "the only theoretical work that I feel is possible for me, is leaving the trace, in the most intelligible outline possible, of the movements by which I am no longer at the place where I was earlier. Hence, if you like, this constant need, or necessity, or desire to plot, so to speak, the points of passage at which each displacement risks resulting in the modification, if not of the whole curve, then at least of the way in which it can be read and grasped in terms of its possible intelligibility."28 The chapters in this volume not only elaborate a range of frameworks of intelligibility that yield new insight into the development of his thought but also make a powerful case for recovering its transformative possibilities for our own present in ways that Foucault did not, and indeed could not have, envisaged.
1Michel Foucault, "Les rapports de pouvoir passent à l'intérieur des corps," in Dits et Écrits III, 1976–1979, ed. Daniel Defert and François Ewald (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 228–229; all translations from French and German are mine.
3Michel Foucault, "Entretien avec Michel Foucault," in Dits et Écrits III, 1976–1979, ed. Daniel Defert and François Ewald (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 146.
4Colin Koopman, "Conduct and Power: Foucault's Methodological Expansions in 1971," in Active Intolerance: Michel Foucault, the Prisons Information Group, and the Future of Abolition, ed. Perry Zurn and Andrew Dilts (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 59–74.
5My formulation here follows Walter Benjamin, "Geschichtsphilosophische Thesen," in Zur Kritik der Gewalt und andere Aufsätze (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1965), 78–94.
6See also Christoph Menke, Critique of Rights, trans. Christopher Turner (Cambridge, UK; Medford, MA: Polity, 2020).
7E.g., Amy Allen, The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016); Deborah Cook, Adorno, Foucault and the Critique of the West (London: Verso Books, 2018); Daniele Lorenzini, "Benjamin/Foucault: histoire, discontinuité, utopie," Phantasia 7 (2018), https://doi.org/10.25518/0774-7136.903.
8E.g., Jean-François Braunstein et al., eds., Foucault(s) (Paris: Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2017); Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson, "Philosophical Practice Following Foucault," Foucault Studies 25 (2018), 55–83, https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v0i25.5574; Colin Koopman and Tomas Matza, "Putting Foucault to Work: Analytic and Concept in Foucaultian Inquiry," Critical Inquiry 39, no. 4 (2013): 817–40; Colin Koopman, "Two Uses of Michel Foucault in Political Theory: Concepts and Methods in Giorgio Agamben and Ian Hacking," Constellations 22, no. 4 (December 1, 2015): 571–85, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12153.
9E.g., Santiago Castro-Gómez, La hybris del punto cero: ciencia, raza e ilustración en la Nueva Granada (1750–1816) (Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2005); Santiago Castro-Gómez, "Michel Foucault y la colonialidad del poder," Tabula Rasa 6 (2007): 153–72; Partha Chatterjee, "The Disciplines in Colonial Bengal," in Texts of Power: Emerging Disciplines in Colonial Bengal, ed. Partha Chatterjee (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 1–29; Marnia Lazreg, Foucault's Orient: The Conundrum of Cultural Difference, From Tunisia to Japan (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2017); Stephen Legg, "Beyond the European Province: Foucault and Postcolonialism," in Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography, ed. Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007), 265–89; Stephen Legg and Deana Heath, eds., South Asian Governmentalities: Michel Foucault and the Question of Postcolonial Orderings, South Asia in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108571982; Ladelle McWhorter, Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-America: A Genealogy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009); Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Genealogies of Coloniality and Implications for Africa's Development," Africa Development 40, no. 3 (January 1, 2015): 13–40; Amy Nigh and Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson, "How Method Travels: Genealogy in Foucault and Castro-Gómez," Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1762726; Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 1995).
10Michel Foucault, The Punitive Society. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1972–1973, ed. Bernard E. Harcourt, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 61.
11Elizabeth F. Cohen, The Political Value of Time: Citizenship, Duration, and Democratic Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2018).
12Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973–1974, ed. Jacques Lagrange and Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 354.
13Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974–1975, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (London and New York: Verso, 2003), 316.
16Castro-Gómez, "Michel Foucault y la colonialidad del poder"; Castro-Gómez, La hybris del punto cero; Santiago Castro-Gómez, Tejidos oníricos: Movilidad, capitalismo y biopolítica en Bogotá (Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2009).
17As an aside, Ludwig's claim that Foucault does not introduce the notion of the dispositif until La volonté de savoir (1976) stands in need of revision. As Meyer's chapter in this volume shows, Foucault used this term as early as 1974. Foucault also makes frequent use of the notion of the dispositif in Surveiller et punir (1975) to theorize disciplinary power and the panoptic dispositif (le dispositif panoptique).
18For exceptions to this trend see Thomas Biebricher, The Political Theory of Neoliberalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019); Thomas Biebricher and Frieder Vogelmann, eds., The Birth of Austerity: German Ordoliberalism and Contemporary Neoliberalism (London; New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2017); Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone Books, 2015); Wendy Brown, In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019); William Callison and Zachary Manfredi, eds., Mutant Neoliberalism: Market Rule and Political Rupture (New York: Fordham University Press, 2019).
19See in particular Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1995).
20Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979–1980, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 80.
21Stuart Elden, Foucault's Last Decade (Malden: Polity, 2016), 112.
22Daniele Lorenzini, "Anarcheology and the Emergence of the Alethurgic Subject in Foucault's On the Government of the Living," Foucault Studies Lectures 3, no. 1 (2020), https://doi.org/10.22439/fsl.vi0.6153.
23Michel Foucault, Subjectivity and Truth. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1980–1981, ed. François Ewald, Alessandro Fontana, and Frédéric Gros (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 76.
26Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990), 157.
Allen, Amy. The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7312/alle17324
Benjamin, Walter. "Geschichtsphilosophische Thesen." In Zur Kritik der Gewalt und andere Aufsätze, 78–94. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1965.
Biebricher, Thomas. The Political Theory of Neoliberalism. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503607835
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